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CONSENT AND THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF THE WORKER 
Marty Laubach and Michael Wallace  
Research in Sociology of Work 
 
Research Paper 
 
Purpose:  
This study tests three theories of determinants of workers’ subjective response to work situations 
– structural factors (measured by individual, organization and job characteristics), general 
disposition, or informal work arrangements as constructed by Laubach’s (2005) “consent deal.”  
 
Design/methodology/approach:  
Data were obtained from the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey, a survey of workers 
covering general working conditions. We constructed 10 models regressing worker perceptions 
and attitudes (e.g. satisfaction, relations with supervisors, meaningfulness) on structural 
determinants. We then used structural equation modeling to identify an underlying factor 
representing a general worker response from elements of the attitudes and perceptions. Finally, 
we regressed a scalar version of the general response factor on the structural determinants using 
the previous models.  
 
Findings: We identified a single second order latent factor underlying the 10 attitudes and 
perceptions which represented the “general subjective response” of workers. This supported the 
concept of a dispositional effect. We then found that structural factors had a minimal effect on 
the subjective response, but that informal arrangements had a very strong effect. This 
undermined the first two theories and supported the third.   
 
Implications: Worker attitudes and perceptions are very resilient to different formal work 
arrangements but are highly influenced by the informal arrangements negotiated between 
workers and front-line management. Organizations can have the strongest effect on developing 
worker support by empowering front-line managers to make informal deals on workplace rules.  
 
Originality/value:  This study offers a means to probe the relationship between formal and 
structural and the informal and subjective worlds of the workplace.  
 
Key words: workplace consent, worker subjectivity, formal structure, informal structure, 
structural equation models, second order latent factor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Consent is a recurring, but understudied, concept in the sociological literature on the 
workplace. In this chapter, we trace the intellectual history of worker consent as emanating from 
the informal organization of work and demonstrate how it affects the subjective experience of the 
worker. We argue that the “consent deal” results from tacit, ongoing negotiations between 
managers and workers in which managers exchange autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in 
decision-making in return for organizational commitment from workers. This consent deal 
results in a tripartite stratification of the workplace into (a) the “administrative clan”—a network 
of workers that cuts across hierarchical strata that is managed by normative control and who 
display high commitment; (b) the “conventional core”—the majority of workers who are 
managed by bureaucratic control and offer moderate commitment; and (c) the “extended 
periphery”—workers who are managed by strict personal or technical control and who return 
minimal commitment.  
 The administrative clan is a privileged social network that can be identified in almost 
every work site of sufficient size whose members effectively run the organization. Members of 
this network are characterized as having high levels of autonomy, flexibility, voice, and 
commitment despite having sometimes quite different formal job responsibilities and positions in 
the formal authority structure. Previous research has demonstrated that informal organization as 
measured by the consent deal has a significant positive effect on objective work outcomes like 
wages (Laubach 2005). In this chapter, we examine how consent structures the subjective 
rewards of the worker. Our findings suggest that the consent is a key factor in shaping workers’ 
subjective experience—advantaging some workers and disadvantaging others—net of other 
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structural variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for future research 
on the workplace. 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONSENT DEAL 
Ever since Mayo’s (1933) famous aphorism that “a happy worker is a productive 
worker,” organizational behaviorists have been motivated to learn more about workers’ 
subjective experience of the workplace.  Departing from Taylor’s (1911) scientific management 
approach that prevailed in earlier decades, Mayo’s human relations movement sought to design 
the workplace in ways that enhanced workers’ job satisfaction in hopes that workers who felt 
they were performing meaningful, enjoyable, and important jobs would work more efficiently 
and profitably. At its core, Mayo’s approach centered on manipulating the structural and physical 
conditions of work, but stopped short of granting workers genuine voice or participation in the 
work process, believing that to be the exclusive prerogative of management. Mayo’s interest in 
job satisfaction spawned a growth industry of research on diverse aspects of workers’ subjective 
experience, including organizational commitment (e.g., Mowday et al.1982; Lincoln and 
Kalleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990), organizational equity and justice (e.g., Leventhal 
1980; Organ 1990; Greenberg 1990), and eventually a conception of organizations as systems of 
exchange, norms, and shared meanings constructed by management (see Pfeffer 1981). Within 
business management circles, this research motivated various initiatives designed to improve 
productivity such as “job enrichment,” “worker participation,” “supportive leadership,” and 
“pursuit of excellence” – most of which met with similarly dubious results (see Hackman and 
Lawler 1971; Staw 1986).  
Mayo’s legacy continues today with research into such diverse areas as negative 
affectivity (Barsky et al 2004), psychological ownership (Van Dyne and Pierce 2004), workplace 
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empowerment (Laschinger et al 2004), and expectations of organizational mobility (Pearce and 
Randel 2004) – all reflecting Mayo’s central assumption that management can improve 
productivity by tweaking the formal arrangements of work and making workers happier.  
An opposing viewpoint argues that workers’ subjective perceptions cannot be so easily 
manipulated by management to influence productivity (Staw and Ross 1985; Staw 1986; Staw 
and Cohen-Charash 2005). This approach argues that workers exhibit a constellation of 
workplace attitudes that are highly correlated with each other, but that these attitudes are 
dispositional rather than situational. In other words, workers are predisposed to be satisfied or 
dissatisfied, fulfilled or alienated, committed or uncommitted, and there is little managers can do 
to alter this fundamental disposition or personality trait. These theorists argue that such attitude 
sets display long-term stability in workers over time and across different jobs, which suggests 
that management interventions are unlikely to improve workers’ job satisfaction. Staw (1986:44) 
frames this argument around advice given by a friend to his children: “their most important 
decision in life would be whether they wanted to be happy or not; everything else is malleable 
enough to fit the answer to this question.”  
Proponents of this dispositional approach might agree with Mayo that a happy worker is a 
productive worker, but they would disagree with the organizational behaviorists that 
management can manipulate organizational structures to improve workers’ job satisfaction. The 
best managers can hope for, according to the dispositional theorists, is to use psychological tests 
to weed out those workers predisposed not to be happy (Staw and Ross 1985). In fact, the 
practice of pre-employment personality screening has “skyrocketed” over the last several years 
(Pepper et al. 2005). While much of this discussion has focused on the effects on job satisfaction, 
there is a clear assumption that job satisfaction is at the center of a wider constellation of 
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perceptions and attitudes that constitute worker dispositions. Further, such dispositions dominate 
workers’ generalized subjective response to the workplace.2  
A third perspective on workers’ subjective states eventually evolved into the informal 
organization approach. This perspective started with Barnard’s (1938) observations describing 
the informal organization of work as rooted in workers’ “willingness to cooperate” and 
Roethlisberger and Dickson’s (1939 [1967]) work linking worker “sentiments,” independent of 
management interventions, to variations in productivity at the Hawthorne plant. Some 
proponents of this approach tried to steer research in the informal organization tradition into a 
direction that Mayo might have endorsed. For instance, Ouchi and Wilkens (1985:464) believed 
that the goal was “to find that large, complex organizations can be made orderly, responsive to 
top management, and ‘rational’ in serving the purposes of their owners.” Similarly, Graham and 
Organ (1993:494) focused on conditions giving rise to “clan” or “covenantal” organizational 
forms that would elicit from workers “any form of contribution, any reasonable exertion of 
effort, and any tolerable sacrifice.” This alignment of worker motivations with management 
interests, constructed within a spirit of cooperation, efficaciously supplied “an appropriate rule to 
govern any possible decision, thus producing a very elegant and complete form of control” 
(Ouchi 1980:139). From this logic, Kunda (1992:11) derived his labor control theory that 
                                            
2 Detractors of this perspective (see Gerhart 2005) point to the checkered history of 
personality tests in job selection. They further note that the personality literature has found that 
processes involved in keeping attitudes stable (disposition) and changing attitudes are often 
“orthogonal,” suggesting that interventions in the workplace could be successful. 
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centered on “normative control,” through which workers “are driven by internal commitment, 
strong identification with company goals, intrinsic satisfaction from work.”  
But other expressions of the informal organization perspective argued that worker 
subjectivity is dependent on deeper processes that lie beneath the formal and rational structures 
of organizations that management controls. This tradition focuses on worker consent as the 
dominant factor influencing workers’ subjective experience in the workplace.3 This variant of 
informal organization theory draws on early findings from researchers like Gouldner (1954:221) 
who noted that an important component of consent was the perception by workers that they had 
“some measure of control over the initiation and administration of the rules.” Gouldner 
(1954:173) surmised that this “measure of control” was rooted in an informal arrangement with 
supervisors, and that workers recognized that “formal rules gave supervisors something with 
which they could ‘bargain’ in order to secure informal cooperation from workers.”  
In a variation of this perspective, Burawoy (1979:xii) acknowledged management’s 
coercive power in the capitalist enterprise, but asserted nonetheless that the smooth and efficient 
production desired by management required of workers “an element of spontaneous consent.” In 
Manufacturing Consent, he focused on the machine shop game of “making out” in which 
workers produced above quota levels to earn incentive pay and banked extra production into a 
kitty from which they would draw when their production lagged below quota levels. As a worker 
                                            
 3 While these and other ethnographic accounts view consent as the central dynamic of the 
workplace, it should be remembered that this is but one aspect of informal organization of the 
workplace. One goal of a broader research agenda is to examine the interplay among these 
multiple features of informal organization and identify their separate influences on subjective 
experiences and material outcomes of workers. 
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in the machine shop, Burawoy found that proficiency in playing the game provided a basis for 
informal status among workers and served as a distraction from the routine and monotony of the 
job. However, Burawoy argued that by playing the game, workers were actively engaged in their 
own exploitation because consenting to the informal rules of the game amounted to acquiescing 
to the capitalist relations of production.  
Burawoy further noted that the informal rules under which the game was constituted 
directly violated the formal procedures of the workplace and that upper management consistently 
admonished supervisors to prevent the banking of surplus production. But supervisors routinely 
ignored upper management’s directives, believing that strict enforcement of formal rules would 
create tensions on the shop floor that would undermine the smoothness of the production 
process. As in Gouldner’s (1954) study, Burawoy found that supervisors quietly acquiesced to 
the suspension of formal work rules in an effort to maintain acceptable levels of production. 
Ultimately, Burawoy contends that the game of making out pervades the entire process of 
production and creates the illusion that workers have real choices in their day-to-day activities 
under capitalism: “It is participation in choosing that generates consent” (Burawoy 1979:27).  
This apparent disconnect between formal work rules and the informal arrangements 
which constitute the lifeblood of the workplace became the central point of Littler and Salaman’s 
(1984) analysis of consent. They argue that “the subjectivity of the employee is – and must be – 
an inevitable ingredient in the organization of work, the achievement of production at work, in 
relations between managers and workers” (Littler and Salaman 1984:54). They echoed Barnard’s 
point that formal structures cannot organize all of the necessary effort or realistically address all 
circumstances that might arise in production. Rather, the routinization of production requires 
some amount of give and take such as bending the rules to achieve extra effort. Workers 
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sometimes exploit this disconnect between formal and informal organization in a form of 
resistance called “working to rule” (see, for example, Garson 1988:102-103) in which they 
refuse to participate in this give and take, thereby disrupting production. Littler and Salaman 
characterize real work activities as the result of continual negotiations between workers and their 
supervisors over interpretations of formal work rules. When successful, this negotiation results in 
an exchange in which employers provide a flexible, humane work environment for workers in 
return for the work effort to achieve necessary levels of production (see also Baldamus 1961, for 
a discussion of the “effort bargain”). Ultimately, they conceptualize consent as the exchange of 
relaxed enforcement of formal work rules for alignment of workers’ motivations with the 
interests of management. 
Laubach (2005) built on Littler and Salaman’s conception by defining consent in terms of 
an informal exchange. His ethnography of office workers suggested that the “the consent deal” 
consists of an informally negotiated exchange of autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in 
decision-making by managers for organizational commitment by workers. He noted that while 
the first three are generally conceived as objective, structural aspects of a worker’s position, 
when measured as self-reports in surveys of workers’ perceptions they evoke a subjective 
component that reflects the outcome of informal negotiations between workers and front-line 
managers. Thus, in surveys a secretary might express similar levels of autonomy as a middle 
manager, and two secretaries in similar formal positions might express vastly different levels of 
voice in decision-making. Laubach argued that while survey researchers might treat such 
discordant responses as “white noise,” in fact they might accurately convey genuine, deeper 
arrangements in the work culture. Laubach saw these informal arrangements as tacit, not 
articulated; that is, workers and managers did not formally negotiate bending the rules in 
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exchange for greater worker effort for to do so would breach formal legitimacy of their 
respective roles. Indeed, both workers and managers exerted more power when the arrangement 
was unspoken and subject to subtle recalibrations as circumstances change. 
In essence, these arrangements constitute informal networks in the workplace that cut 
across the formal hierarchy and actually routinize and regulate the inherently conflictual nature 
of worker-manager relations. Laubach observed these negotiations result in managers informally 
applying different forms of control to workers at the same level within the same unit – similar to 
the “cadre” and “hired hand” continuum discussed in leader-member exchange literature (see 
Graen and Schiemann 1978; Lagace 1990). He found that this led to an informal structuring of 
the workforce – a tripartite stratification into what he called (a) the “administrative clan” – a 
network of workers that cut across function and hierarchical strata who exercised high levels of 
autonomy, flexibility and participation and were managed using normative control, (b) the 
“conventional core” – the majority of workers managed by bureaucratic control and offering 
moderate commitment, and (c) the “extended periphery” – workers laboring under the strictest 
personal or technical control and who return minimal commitment. Laubach’s ethnographic 
observations indicated that this informal stratification translated into very real differences in 
status and power, and that it could be operationalized using the consent deal. 
Laubach conceptualized the administrative clan as a privileged social network that 
extended beyond professional and managerial ranks which was present in one form or another in 
almost every work site he had either studied or participated in as a manager. Moreover, workers 
in almost every work setting intuitively recognize this network and can identify “insiders” and 
“outsiders” in their own workplaces. Members of this network are distinguishable by having high 
levels of all four of the consent deal characteristics—despite having sometimes quite different 
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job responsibilities and positions in the formal authority structure. The inclusion in the clan of 
members in lower formal positions—and the occasional exclusion of some members with high 
formal authority—argued that there was something going on beyond the conventionally 
understood relationship of structurally determined autonomy-producing commitment—i.e., 
something was producing both autonomy and commitment in structural positions where they 
would not be expected. This was especially evident when two clerical workers at the same 
formal structural level with the same formal job descriptions actually had very different 
responsibilities and would be treated very differently by coworkers, professionals, and managers. 
Furthermore, this differential treatment was for the most part accepted as legitimate by other 
workers and even something to be “earned.”  
Laubach concluded that that “something” that was producing both autonomy and 
commitment was the “consent deal,” a tacit, informal understanding that the worker will give 
more if management bends certain work rules, specifically autonomy, scheduling, and 
participation. This tacit bending of the rules, negotiated on an ongoing basis between supervisors 
and workers, supersedes the formal structural characteristics of the job, and when measured by 
self-reports is often seen as statistical noise. Laubach’s argument thus flies in the face of 
conventional wisdom that structurally-induced autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in 
decision-making create commitment. Rather, he claims that autonomy, commitment, flexibility, 
and voice are all simultaneously created by the consent deal.4    
                                            
4 To further explicate this point, a manager whose director is replaced by someone who wants 
to bring in his or her own managerial staff will find quickly that formal structural position is no 
guarantor of autonomy, voice, and even schedule flexibility. Even in managerial and professional 
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Laubach’s operationalization of the consent deal is thus a repackaging of familiar 
workplace elements that appear in studies of both formal (e.g. Edwards 1979; Ouchi 1980; 
Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Graham and Organ 1993) and informal (e.g. Gouldner 1954; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) workplace stratification systems. Hodson’s (2001) Dignity at Work 
reflects a similar orientation (see also Hodson 1996; Hodson and Roscigno 2004) and is of 
special interest to our study for several reasons. First, his analysis attempts to unify the 
experience of work under the overarching concept of worker dignity, an ambitious task to be 
sure, but one worthy of undertaking if we are to understand the complexities of the 
intersubjective world of work. Second, much of Hodson’s discussion straddles the boundary 
between formal and informal aspects of the workplace and emphasizes the negotiated and 
contingent character of workplace outcomes.  His approach emphasizes worker agency or “the 
active and creative performance of assigned roles in ways that give meaning and content to those 
roles beyond what is institutionally scripted” (Hodson 2001:16). Third, while the notion of 
consent is “buried” in Hodson’s work, it is present nonetheless. His conceptualization of 
“citizenship behaviors” (see also Organ 1988) and “worker resistance” (Jermier, Knights and 
Nord 1995; Edwards and Scullion 1982) represent opposite poles on a continuum of worker 
consent (see Hodson 1999). For instance, Hodson’s discussion of worker resistance centers on 
the “effort bargain” in which workers engage in a variety of behaviors to withhold cooperation 
from management (Hodson 2001:42, 62; see also Baldamus 1961; Edwards and Scullion 
                                                                                                                                            
positions, the level of components of the consent deal is more the outcome of ongoing 
supervisor-supervisee negotiation than formal position – even though the negotiations are 
expected to start with high levels. 
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1982:154). Finally, while Hodson acknowledges the importance of autonomy, participation, 
schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment5 in various places in his theory of worker 
dignity, he does not conceptualize them, as we do, as components of the “consent deal” which 
we contend is the foundation for understanding the subjective world of the worker as well as the 
informal stratification of the workplace. 
In this study, we follow Laubach’s (2005) conceptualization of the consent deal as based 
on the informal exchange by employers of perceived autonomy, participation, and schedule 
flexibility, in return for organizational commitment (or “loyalty”) by workers. This 
conceptualization permits that autonomy, participation, and schedule flexibility measured as 
perceptions by workers can diverge from the same characteristics measured as structural 
elements of the position. Using statistical models of workers’ responses to a general survey of 
the workplace, we test the utility of the consent deal as an explanation for a range of subjective 
experiences of workers.  
This analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first, we develop ten measures that tap 
diverse dimensions of workers’ subjective experience. Then, controlling for variables tapping 
individual characteristics and structural and organizational features of the workplace, we 
                                            
5 Hodson (1991) argues that autonomy (pp. 10-13) and participation (pp. 13-16) are key 
elements that are present in workplaces that support worker dignity. Schedule flexibility is 
related to overwork and excessive hours (pp. 75-76), which is viewed as an obstacle to dignity. 
And various aspects of organizational commitment such as commitment to organizational goals, 
pride in work, and extra effort (pp. 45-46) are cited as examples of worker citizenship behaviors 
that foster cohesion in the workplace and heightened productivity.  
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investigate how the consent deal, using Laubach’s (2005) operationalization, impacts each of 
these subjective variables. If informal organization theory is supported, consent will have a 
strong positive effect on such outcomes as workers’ perceptions of meaningful work, satisfaction 
with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and co-workers, and promotion and 
pay equity. It should have negative consequences on perceived discrimination, job stress, and 
self-estrangement. Moreover, these effects of consent should rival or exceed those of the 
structural variables. On the other hand if, as organizational behaviorists believe, management can 
tweak administrative procedures and work structures to improve worker perceptions and 
attitudes, then consent will have weaker or non-significant results compared to structural 
characteristics of organizations.  
The second stage of our analysis articulates the assumption from the disposition research 
that there is a single latent factor underlying the measures of the worker’s subjective world. 
Disposition theory would argue that this latent factor should be relatively uninfluenced by the 
situational factors specified in the model. We test this by specifying workers’ subjective response 
using a second order measurement model, constructing it as a scalar variable, and estimating the 
relative effects of consent and the structural factors on it using the same model as for the ten 
original measures of subjective experience. For organizational behavior theory to be supported, 
structural factors must exert the strongest effect on workers’ subjective response; however, if 
consent exerts the dominant effect on subjective experience, consent theory is supported. On the 
other hand, if none of the measures in the model exert a strong effect on the overall subjective 
response, both situational approaches – organizational behavior and informal organization – will 
be discredited as key factors influencing workers’ subjective experiences, leaving disposition 
theory as the most viable explanation. 
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Our analysis follows the generalized workplace model portrayed in Figure 1. This model 
displays the key independent variables organized under individual characteristics, organizational 
characteristics, formal structural position and job characteristics, and informal position (i.e., the 
consent deal). The ten variables that measure different dimensions of the subjective experience 
of the workplace are shown as outcomes. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
METHODS AND DATA 
In this analysis, we utilize the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey (IQES), which was 
conducted in the summer of 1996 using the facilities of the Center for Survey Research at the 
Indiana University Institute for Social Research Survey (see Wallace et al.1996). The IQES 
resulted in 705 respondents (84 percent response rate) from across Indiana selected randomly 
from working adults (defined as people over 18 working more than 20 hours per week) 
employed in non-agricultural jobs. In households where more than one member met the 
requirements of the sampling frame, a computer algorithm randomly selected the respondent 
who was interviewed. The survey instrument covered a broad spectrum of quality of employment 
issues and developed several scales with acceptable reliability levels (i.e., most scales used 
between three to five items). All measures used in the analysis (both individual items and scales) 
are shown in the Appendix. 
The analysis for this paper was restricted to workers in organizations with 10 or more 
employees. Smaller organizations tend to be characterized by simpler management structures, 
higher face-to-face interaction, and bonds of loyalty that mitigate formal organization. We 
suspect that larger organizations, because of their size and complexity, are fertile ground for the 
intermingling of formal and informal organization. This restriction reduced the possible sample 
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from the IQES to 582 respondents, but this number was further reduced in individual models 
because of missing data on some of the variables.  
Dependent Variables 
We derived ten variables to measure diverse dimensions of the subjective experience of 
the workplace. These are meaningful work (the reverse of Blauner’s [1964] concept of 
meaninglessness), satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with technology, relations with 
supervisors, relations with coworkers, promotion equity, pay equity, perceived discrimination, 
and self-estrangement (another dimension of alienation discussed by Blauner [1964]). 
Measuring Consent 
Following Laubach (2005), we model consent as a second order latent factor6 comprised 
of four latent factors representing commonly discussed attributes of work: autonomy, voice in 
decision-making, schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment. We acknowledge that this 
formulation combines variables generally used at different levels of workplace models (i.e., three 
job characteristics that are often modeled as determinants of organizational commitment) but 
offer two arguments for this strategy beyond Laubach’s ethnography. First, even some of the 
early proponents of structural analysis recognized the subjective nature of the job characteristics 
as outcomes of power struggles (Kalleberg et al. 1981). Second, we argue that the three job 
characteristics, as measured in surveys of workers, are in fact subjective interpretations, and 
could easily measure a secretary’s level of autonomy as being as high as a manager’s. 
                                            
6 A second order latent factor model is derived from two or more first order latent factors 
instead of the distinctive items that comprise the first order factors.  
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Researchers have generally accepted these as objective measures since Hackman and Lawler 
(1971) demonstrated high correlations between worker and manager ratings of job 
characteristics, but Laubach argued that as subjective measures they are susceptible to consent 
and should therefore be modeled as indicators or measures of the underlying “consent deal” – a 
relationship expressed by the measurement model depicted with parameter estimates in Figure 2. 
We follow Laubach in arguing that this configuration resolves the problem of predicting 
subjective responses with a variable constructed using subjective responses—i.e., the real causal 
factor is the worker’s position in the informal structure, which is measured by the elements of the 
consent deal.7  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We used maximum likelihood estimation (see Bollen 1989) but verified the results with 
asymptotically distribution free estimators to ensure that there were no distribution problems 
caused by using categorical variables. The fit statistics supported the assertion that the revised 
model fits the data (χ2=30.6, df=24, p=0.17). We finally constructed an additive scale from these 
using the path values from the latent factor model. The Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) invalidity 
statistic (Ψ=.01) verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic (ρTS=.85) shows a 
                                            
7 The survey we use for this study is the “Indiana Quality of Employment Survey” and 
almost all the questions we use are derived from the nationally-based Quality of Employment 
Survey in the 1970s and have been widely used in other surveys. Thus, the conceptual 
distinctiveness of most of the scales is well-established in previous research. In exploratory 
factor analyses, we confirmed that the subjective scales were distinctive from each other and 
distinctive from the consent deal scale. 
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high correlation between the scale and the underlying factor, supporting our use of the composite 
scale. Cronbach’s coefficient (α=.75) indicates that this is a reliable measure for consent. 
Other Independent Variables  
The model controls for individual characteristics of the respondent, organizational 
characteristics, and formal structural position and job characteristics. Respondent characteristics 
consist of age, sex, race, education, and marital status. Organizational characteristics include 
employer size, organization scope (a four-point measure indexing local, statewide, national, or 
multinational operations), not-for-profit organization (dummy variable), government 
organization (dummy variable), and industry concentration based on sales8 (see Pfeffer and 
Salancik [1978]). Job characteristics include the level of technological change, whether the job is 
part-time (dummy variable for working less than 35 hours per week), hours at other jobs (a 
measure of multiple job holding), hours worked at home, organization tenure, substantive 
complexity (a commonly-used measure of job-specific skill), occupational skill (a scale derived 
from eight occupational measures from the U.S. Labor Department’s Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles and other sources), and union membership. We use a derivative of Wright’s (1978) class 
scheme to approximate formal structural position, because it identifies broad structural categories 
                                            
8 Industry concentration was missing for non-profit organizations. For these organizations, 
we assigned the mean value for all for-profit organizations to non-profits. This allows non-profits 
to remain in the analysis but effectively exempts these organizations from the analysis of 
industry concentration. It also results in a conservative estimate of the effect of industry 
concentration in the overall analysis. 
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in the organization based on ownership, managerial authority, and job skill. Our measure yields 
five class dummy variables (large employers, large managers, small managers, first-line 
supervisors, and autonomous workers) that are contrasted with the excluded category of 
nonautonomous workers. We report standardized coefficients for each of the class dummy 
variables and use sheaf coefficients to measure the overall impact of structural position. The 
sheaf coefficient, which was originated by Heise (1972), allows the effects of multiple dummy 
variables to be summarized with a single coefficient that approximates a standardized regression 
coefficient. Thus, in each of our regression models we derive a sheaf coefficient to represent the 
overall effects of Wright’s class structure dummy variables. 
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE VARIABLES 
The results of the first part of our analysis are presented in Table 1. The first model 
shows that consent has a strong positive effect on whether the respondent considers his or her 
work to be meaningful (βconsent=.29). In fact, the effect of consent is the strongest in the model, 
nearly one-third larger than the next largest effect, substantive complexity (βsubstantive 
complexity=.21). Individual characteristics such as being female and being older show positive 
effects on meaningful work. Working for a global operation, working full time, being new to the 
organization, and being in a unionized position are also determinants of perceiving work as 
meaningful. As for structural position, large employers respond as finding less meaning in their 
work than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole is 
not significant. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The second model shows only two key determinants of satisfaction with job security, 
consent (βconsent=.41) and age (βage=-.13). No other factors are significant at the p<.05 level. In 
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the third model, consent is again the strongest determinant of satisfaction with technology with a 
positive effect (βconsent=.29), barely edging out the second strongest determinant, technological 
change (βtechnological change=.27). Substantive complexity is also positively related to satisfaction 
with technology and tenure with the organization is negatively related.  
In model four, consent (βconsent=.31) has a positive effect on relations with co-workers and 
again is the strongest predictor in the model, over twice the magnitude of the next strongest 
variable. Women and union membership are positively related to relations with coworkers, and 
hours worked at home is negatively related. Among the structural position variables, large 
managers display significantly lower levels of coworker relations than non-autonomous workers, 
but as in the previous models the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant. 
In the fifth model, consent shows a very strong positive effect on relations with 
supervisors (βconsent=.48), almost three times the effect of the next strongest variable. Again, 
women and those who work fewer hours at home have better relations with supervisors, as do 
workers who have less tenure with the organization and workers whose jobs have higher levels 
of substantive complexity. Being a first-line supervisor has a very strong, negative effect on 
relations with their managers relative to the relationship that non-autonomous workers have with 
them, and structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is significant. 
In model six, consent (βconsent=.59) has a very large positive impact on the perception of 
promotion equity, more than five times the effect of age. In this model, first-line supervisors 
respond with a lower perception of promotion equity than non-autonomous workers, but 
structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is not significant. 
The seventh model shows that consent has a strong positive impact on pay equity 
(βconsent=.35), almost three times the magnitude of the next strongest predictor, working in 
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government (βgovernment=-.12), and almost four times as great as working for non-profit 
organizations (βnot-for-profit=-.09). These results suggest that workers in government and non-profit 
corporations have significantly lower perceptions of pay equity than workers in the private 
sector. Other significantly positive determinants of pay equity are being white, tenure with the 
organization, and union membership.  
In model eight, consent has a strong negative effect on perceived discrimination 
(βconsent=-.28) suggesting that workers with high levels of consent are protected from 
discriminatory treatment in the workplace. Again, consent is the strongest variable in the model, 
substantially higher than the sheaf coefficient for structural position (βstructural position=.17), which 
is based largely on the fact that small managers and first-line supervisors perceive significantly 
larger levels of discrimination than non-autonomous workers. Workers who are racial minorities 
and workers who are unmarried report higher levels of perceived discrimination, as do workers 
in less competitive industries and respondents who work more hours on other jobs. 
In the ninth model, consent has a strong negative effect on job stress (βconsent=-.19), 
equivalent in magnitude to the sheaf coefficient for structural position (βstructural position=.19), which 
is based on the fact that large managers, small managers, and first-line supervisors all have 
significantly higher levels of job stress than non-autonomous workers. Working in jobs with high 
levels of substantive complexity increases job stress, evidencing the highest effect of any 
variable in the model (βsubstantive complexity=.24). The remaining significant predictor of job stress is 
hours worked at home. 
Finally, in model ten, consent has a strong negative impact on self-estrangement 
(βconsent=-.46), easily dwarfing the effects of the next closest variable. Women have lower levels 
of self-estrangement, as do workers with higher education. However, workers whose jobs have 
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higher levels of substantive complexity – higher emphasis on training and change – tend to 
report higher levels of self-estrangement. Lower managers are significantly more self-estranged 
than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant.  
Summarizing the effects across the variables that tap the subjective world of the worker, 
consent has the strongest effect in nine of the ten models we examined, and shares second in the 
tenth (i.e., job stress). Its effects are in the expected direction, with positive effects on 
meaningful work, satisfaction with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and 
co-workers, promotion and pay equity; and negative effects on perceived discrimination, job 
stress, and self-estrangement. Moreover, while organizational, job, and structural position 
variables achieve statistical significance sporadically, their effects are not as consistently strong 
across the ten outcome variables. Substantive complexity (i.e., job skill) leads the way among 
these variables, achieving statistical significance in five of the ten models. It enhances the 
perception that the job is meaningful, satisfaction with technology, and relations with 
supervisors, but at the expense of making the job more stressful and inducing self-estrangement. 
Longer tenure with an organization has a largely negative effect, stifling the sense that the job is 
meaningful, reducing satisfaction with technology, and diminishing relations with supervisors, 
but with a positive effect on pay equity. Similarly, jobs with more hours worked at home tend to 
diminish relations with coworkers and managers, and increase job stress. On the other hand, 
union membership enhanced the perception that the job was meaningful, relations with 
coworkers, and the perception of pay equity. Factors such as technological change, occupational 
skill levels, and even working only on a single job had minor independent effects on the 
subjective measures across the board. 
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Organizational factors, often theorized to be important in promoting a hegemonic 
ideological influence over workers (see Vallas 1991), have relatively limited effects on the 
subjective experience of the workplace.  Employer size did not affect any subjective measure. 
The organizational scope variable, consistent with expectations, showed that working in more 
localized settings enhanced the perception that work is meaningful. Working for government and 
non-profit corporations reduced the sense of pay equity. Similarly, industry concentration, a 
measure indicating a less competitive environment for the organization, only increased the 
perception of workplace discrimination. 
Finally, while there are occasionally significant effects for some of the structural position 
variables (i.e., class), the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole achieves significance 
in only three of the ten models. Importantly, most of the significant effects of structural position 
emanate from lower managers and first-line supervisors, suggesting the importance of 
administrative personnel who have direct, day-to-day contact with rank-and-file workers. Hence, 
the analyses support our argument that consent has a pervasive effect on workers’ subjective 
response that typically equals or exceeds the effect of formal structural variables. 
ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE LATENT FACTOR 
In the next stage of the analysis, we ask whether there is a single latent factor underlying 
the subjective experience of work – that is, whether the subjective world of the worker can be 
expressed as a single constellation of measures that unifies diverse dimensions of workers’ 
subjective experience. We first reversed the key for perceived discrimination, job stress, and self-
estrangement to put them in the same direction as the other seven subjective experience variables 
in Table 1. Then, we conducted a factor analysis of all ten subjective experience variables (five 
scales and five single measures). This factor analysis yielded two factors, one on which all ten 
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subjective experience variables loaded and explained 25 percent of the variance, and the other 
which explained only three percent of the variance. The first factor had a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.75, indicating a robust factor that included all ten subjective experience variables. 
Next, we used structural equation modeling to specify subjective response as a second 
order latent factor model using the 19 individual items that comprised the 10 subjective 
experience variables (see Appendix 1). The first attempt at a second order specification including 
all 19 items yielded a model with poor fit statistics (χ2=369, df=147, p<.001) indicating that the 
model did not fit the data. While we agree with Bollen and Long (1993) that rejection of models 
should not be based exclusively on chi-squared, we nevertheless sought to identify a more 
parsimonious model that included theoretically justifiable improvements. Our first attempt at 
parsimony combined work is meaningful and the reversed self-estrangement into a first order 
factor of integration with work, dropped job stress as more of a physical outcome of work than 
an attitude, dropped satisfaction with technology, satisfaction with pay compared to others at 
your workplace, and discrimination by race because they seem more closely tied to situations 
than to the underlying factor. This dramatically improved the fit of the model (χ2=202, df=84, 
p<.001), but was still beyond the chi-squared criteria for acceptance.9 After a bit more 
experimentation, we found that removing two final items – satisfaction with supervisor and 
finding coworkers helpful – resulted in a satisfactory fit (χ2=67, df=59,  p=.214). The data-
specific model which comprises seven variables and incorporates 13 of the original 19 items is 
shown in Figure 3.  
                                            
9 However, we note that the normed fit indices GFI, AGFI, NFI, IFI and CFI had all 
improved over the original model to greater than .9. 
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We next performed a factor analysis on this subset of variables and derived four factors 
which explained 27 percent, eight percent, five percent and four percent of the variance 
respectively. The first factor included all seven remaining subjective experience variables (six 
scales and one individual item) and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha=.80, offering a substantial 
improvement over the alpha we derived for the original scale (α=.75) and supporting our 
assertion that the reduced factor more robustly measures the subjective experience concept. 
Using the path values as weights, we found that the Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) statistics 
support the use of an additive scale with an invalidity statistic (Ψ<.01) verifying that there is 
only one second order factor, a validity statistic (ρTS=.93) showing a high correlation between 
the scale and the underlying factor, and a reliability statistic (Ω= .86) revealing a much higher 
reliability than Cronbach’s alpha. 
These results support a key expectation of the disposition approach that there is a single 
underlying latent factor that taps the subjective world of the worker. The next step is to 
determine whether this dispositional variable is determined by either structural variables or 
consent. To investigate this, we regressed the new latent factor portrayed in Figure 3 on the same 
set of variables as before. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. To isolate the effects 
of consent on subjective experience, we show two models, first excluding, then including 
consent.10  
                                            
10 One potential problem with this procedure is the possible reverse causality between one of 
the components of the subjective response scale—discrimination—and consent. We contend that 
one factor mitigating this argument is that discrimination fits the subjectivity scale so well 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the first model of Table 2, which excludes consent, we find two significant 
determinants of subjective experience – industry concentration, which exerts a negative effect 
(βindustrial concentration=-.11) and substantive complexity, which shows a strong positive effect 
(βsubstantive complexity=.24). This provides evidence in support of the organizational behavior 
argument that structural factors, specifically environmental (i.e., market competition) and 
technological (i.e., job-specific skills) dimensions, impact the subjective experience of work. 
However, numerous other structural variables in the model are non-significant and the R-squared 
is only .14, meaning that dispositional theorists could also claim support for their argument that 
the subjective experience of work is largely unaltered by structural variables.  
In the second model in Table 2, we test support for the informal organization argument 
by adding consent to the model. Here we find that consent is the dominant predictor (βconsent=.64) 
of the latent factor of subjective experience, with a greater magnitude than for any of the ten 
                                                                                                                                            
indicating that it is part of the broader subjective response. We would acknowledge that this 
subjective response might be altered to exclude discrimination if, for example, there were a 
seismic shift in discriminatory behavior that affected workers on a broad scale (but not a single 
incident of discrimination in a single workplace). In a similar manner, other elements might enter 
or exit the subjective response scale if there were a dramatic shift in relations with supervisors, 
pay equity, or other dimensions that cut across all the workplaces in our sample. One lesson of 
this exercise is that we do not claim that the particular configuration of the subjective response 
scale in our analysis is fixed or static. Rather, the subjective response scale should be viewed as a 
fluid and dynamic concept subject to change over time.       
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original subjective experience variables. Industry concentration, which was significant in the 
previous model, is now non-significant, and substantive complexity has been greatly reduced 
(βsubstantive complexity=.09), indicating that its effects are partly mediated through consent. New 
variables that achieve significance are education (βeducation=.10) and the sheaf coefficient for class 
which indexes structural position (βstructural position=.16). The latter finding results primarily from 
negative effects of first-line supervisors and small managers relative to non-autonomous 
workers. Importantly, the R-squared for the model including consent jumps to 45 percent of the 
variance, a more than threefold increase over the model that excluded consent (R-squared=.14). 
On balance, these results suggest strong support for the informal organization argument and 
weak support for organizational behavior arguments, and the evidence for the disposition 
argument is mixed given the strong effect of consent on workers’ subjective experience.11 
                                            
11 Importantly, the results of the regression model shown in the second model in Table 2 are 
not much different from results when we regressed the scale constructed from the mean of the 
original items or from the theoretically justified reduced model. In both analyses, we found that 
consent was the dominant predictor with significant effects for education, hours worked at home, 
and the sheaf coefficient for structural position, all at approximately the same magnitudes. The 
R-squared showed that both model explained around 43 percent of the variance, similar to the 
model in Table 2. The bottom line is that whether the second order latent variable is derived from 
the looser criterion of the mean of all 10 original items or from the stricter criterion provided by 
the structural equation models, the results lead us to the same conclusion – that consent is the 
major determinant of the worker’s subjective world. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The subjective world of the worker has been a topic of continuing interest in the study of 
the workplace. Workplace theorists have generally subscribed to one of three perspectives on 
how the subjective experience of work is determined: (1) as a response to structural 
characteristics of the organization or job, some of which can be manipulated by management; (2) 
as an outcome of the consent deal that arises in the ongoing social construction of informal 
relations at the point of production; or (3) as a direct reflection of the general disposition of the 
worker, a constellation of attitudes that is relatively impervious to change as a result of 
workplace variables. Our research largely rejects the first, provides qualified support for the 
third, and strongly endorses the second of these perspectives.   
Our results point convincingly to the conclusion that there is a single latent factor 
underlying much of the subjective world of the worker and it is primarily determined by consent, 
rather than structural factors. Thus, the structural theory – that worker subjectivity is affected by 
how a job is structured – finds little support. Counterintuitive as it may be, workers’ subjective 
response seems largely unaffected by occupational skills, tenure with the organization, the 
opportunity to work at home, or even whether the job is full or part time. The single latent factor 
which organizes a diverse range of subjective work experiences might be read as partial support 
for disposition theory. However, the central role played by the consent deal in structuring 
workers’ subjective response undermines disposition theory and points to the importance of the 
informal relations perspective. Workers’ subjective experiences – their underlying perceptions of 
fairness, job security, relations with supervisors and co-workers, perceptions of discrimination, 
and work integration – are primarily determined by the configuration of perceived autonomy, 
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schedule flexibility, voice in decision-making, and organizational commitment that constitutes 
the core components of the consent deal.  
The centrality of consent follows closely from Burawoy’s (1979) Manufacturing 
Consent. Burawoy’s work represents a watershed moment for the sociological study of work in 
the contemporary era because, in the face of largely structural arguments about the organization 
of the workplace, it pointed instead to the importance of the culture of the shop floor or the 
office. Following Burawoy, a largely ethnographic tradition in the study of work has directed 
researchers to pay attention to the disconnect that often exists between formal structural 
arrangements in the workplace and the informal aspects of organizational life. Two recurring 
themes in this research are the wide gap between managerial rhetoric about administrative 
practices and organizational reality and the central role of consent in bridging the disconnect 
between these two realms of organizational life (cf., Juravich 1985; Grenier 1988; Finlay 1988; 
Graham 1995). For example, Vallas’s recent research (2003a; 2003b) highlights the futile efforts 
of management to implement structural change in the workplace in the absence of consent, or 
what may be called worker resistance (cf., Fantasia 1988; Jermier et al.1994; Roscigno and 
Hodson 2004). Vallas concludes that managerial implementation of several “teamwork” 
initiatives in four paper processing plants occasionally resulted in worker integration and 
achieved limited success. But more typically these programs failed because they relied too 
heavily on scientific and technical rationality and neglected to address the underlying normative 
processes which might have provided a moral foundation for more progressive workplace 
change. In short, the workers recognized the top-down initiatives of management for what they 
were, schemes for more effective control of workers in the hopes of eliciting higher rates of 
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productivity, and largely withheld their consent or actively resisted them. Somewhere, Mayo’s 
critics smiled.   
Our research builds upon the lessons learned from previous ethnographic research. Using 
a representative sample of workers from a wide cross-section of occupations, industries, and 
organizations in Indiana, we derive a quantitative measure of consent and demonstrate its utility 
in explaining a wide array of subjective experiences in the generalized workplace. Our research 
thus provides strong evidence for the claim that the dynamics of informal organization and 
consent, so richly illustrated in previous ethnographic studies, are a central force in the 
structuring of workers’ subjective experiences. So far as we know, our research is the first effort 
to explore quantitatively the importance of consent in shaping workers’ subjective experiences 
using a broad, representative sample of workers. We encourage other researchers not only to 
replicate our analyses with other quantitative data sets but also to develop longitudinal studies of 
these phenomena to better identify the temporal processes involved.. In this way, we can better 
establish the generalizability of results about the workers’ subjective world provided through 
ethnographic studies. 
Our results should not be read as a claim that consent is the only salient feature of the 
informal organization. Other informal networks such as friendship or ethnic networks or even 
sport betting pools can certainly be consequential in the workplace and the interconnections 
among these various aspects of informal organization are worth exploring. Indeed, we view it as 
part of a broader research agenda to examine the interplay among consent and other features of 
informal organization, as well as to identify how these different aspects of informal organization 
affect both subjective experiences and objective work outcomes like income, job tenure, and 
mobility.   
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From a theoretical perspective, these results are far-reaching. The relative impotence of 
structural variables in explaining workers’ subjective experiences was frankly surprising to us 
given the longstanding tradition of research pointing to the centrality of technology (e.g., Perrow 
1967; Blauner 1964; Braverman 1974; Zuboff 1988) and other organizational factors (see Burns 
and Stalker 1961; Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990) in 
shaping worker attitudes. We are leery of drawing conclusions that summarily dismiss structural 
explanations and feel that a fuller array of structural variables than are available from the IQES 
might well have shown stronger results. Nevertheless, we believe our results give new urgency to 
the study of informal organization and its effects, particularly in broader empirical settings as 
represented by surveys and using quantitative analytical methods. Further, we have demonstrated 
that worker agency, that is, the capacity of workers to actively negotiate, manipulate, and change 
workplace rules, is at least as important as managers’ capacity to promulgate workplace 
structures that elicit higher worker productivity.  
From a practical perspective, our results should not be read to suggest that managers 
should stop structuring the workplace to improve conditions for workers. Instead, the strongest 
“recommendation” that flows from our research is that workers are most integrated when they 
are equal partners with management in the formulation of workplace policies and, as co-equals, 
consent to the enterprise. Managers should also recognize that the strongest influence on worker 
subjectivity comes from their relations with their immediate supervisors. However, 
management’s strongest “tool” with which to influence workers – supervisors – are themselves 
conflicted in their relations with their supervisors, their sense of promotion equity, perceived 
discrimination, stress, and most importantly, the underlying subjective factor. 
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This study demonstrates the power of our measure of consent in statistical studies of the 
generalized workplace. Since it is constructed from fairly standard workplace measures, further 
studies should examine past data sets to explore how levels of consent and its effects have 
changed over time. More importantly, as a measure of worker subjectivity, analyses 
incorporating consent offer an opportunity to explore more fully how workplace subjectivity 
affects subjective responses to other arenas of modern social life.  
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Appendix A. Definitions of Variables 
Standard responses are 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and 
4=strongly disagree, with “neither agree nor disagree” not prompted. These are recoded to reflect 
higher levels of agreement, with “neither agree nor disagree” coded at 2.5. Means, standard 
deviations, alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees and no missing 
values for consent scale. 
Consent Mean (stdev) 
Autonomy Agreement with statements (standard responses):  
idecide: It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my 
job gets done. 
3.38 
(0.85) 
lotofsay: I have a lot of say about what happens on my job. 2.91 
(0.91) 
freedom: My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my 
work [this was dropped from full consent model] 
3.16 
(0.93) 
Computed as mean score. Reliability α =.66 3.15 
(0.69) 
Schedule 
flexibility 
Please tell me how much say you have in the following areas 
(1=a lot of say, 2=some say, 3=none at all; reflected for higher 
values to indicate greater say):  
 
sayhours: The number of hours you work 1.91 
(0.76) 
saydays: The days of the week you work. 1.80 
(0.82) 
saytime: The time of day you work. 1.83 
(0.76) 
Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that 
1=1, 2=3, and 3=5) Reliability α=.79 
1.85 
(0.66) 
Voice in 
decision-making 
Agreement with statements (standard responses): 
partdecs: My job does not allow me to participate in important 
decisions that affect my organization. (Not reflected so higher 
values indicate greater participation) 
2.65 
(1.03) 
Organizational 
commitment 
Agreement with statements (standard responses):  
workhard: I am willing to work harder than I have to help my 
employer succeed 
3.48 
(0.70) 
myvalues: I find that my values and my employer's values are 
very similar  
2.93 
(0.99) 
iamproud: I am proud to be working for my employer 3.34 
(0.80) 
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.70 3.25 
(0.66) 
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Individual Characteristics  
Gender Dichotomous variable (Female=1) 0.47 
(0.5) 
Race Computed as a dichotomous variable (white=1) from a question 
that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was 
89.3% white. 
0.88 
(0.33) 
Age  Computed from year of birth.  39.14 
(11.8) 
Education Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and 
grouped by attainment (1=high school, 2=some college, 
3=college degree and graduate work) 
13.70 
(2.27) 
Marital status Computed as a dichotomous variable (married=1) from a 
question that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced, 
separated, and never married. 
0.60 
(0.49) 
Organizational Characteristics  
Employer size  How many people work for your employer at all locations? (1=1 
through 9, 2=10 through 49, 3=50 through 99, 4=100 through 
499, 5=500 through 999, 6=1000 through 1999, and 7=2000+)  
Note: Respondents were asked directly, but these categories 
were offered if respondents did not provide an estimate. This 
study recoded responses into categories. In 12% of the cases the 
survey staff obtained organization size through outside sources. 
5.12 
(1.94) 
Organization 
scope 
Computed into local, statewide, national, and multinational as 
the highest level using the following questions:  
2.65 
(1.10) 
Does the company (organization) you work for have more than 1 
location in Indiana?  
.66 
(.47) 
Does your company (organization) have locations in other 
states?  
.63 
(.48) 
Does your company (organization) have locations outside the 
United States? 
.33 
(.47) 
Not-for-profit Recoded as a dichotomous variable from: In your present job do 
you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit 
organization, or are you self-employed? (Not-for-profit=1) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
Government  Recoded as a dichotomous variable from In your present job do 
you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit 
organization, or are you self-employed? (Government=1) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
Industry 
concentration 
Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they 
worked for, with a follow up question asking what product or 
50.66 
(28.03) 
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by sales service the company provided. These were coded to the 1990 
Industrial Classification System using the Alphabetical Index of 
Industries and Occupations, published by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Industry environmental 
data such as the concentration ratio in corporate sales were 
appended by industry code based on data obtained from the IRS 
Sourcebook: Statistics of Income, 1993. Corporate Income Tax 
Returns. Missing values (i.e. from government organizations) 
were recoded to the sample mean to ensure that the cases are not 
excluded from the overall analysis but do not contribute to the 
analysis of this factor. 
Job Characteristics  
Technological 
change 
Since you began your present job, how much change has there 
been in the technology you use on your job? (1=very much, 
2=some, 3=not very much) 
An additional volunteered category of “none” was added and 
responses were reflected to increase with increasing change. 
3.01 
(0.89) 
Part-time work Computed from On average, how many hours per week do you 
work? (1=less than 35 hours) 
.10 
(.29) 
Hours at other 
jobs 
On average, about how many hours per week do you work in all 
other jobs outside of your main job?  
2.06 
(6.93) 
Hours worked at 
home 
On average, about how many hours per week, if any, do you 
work at home doing things for your job?  
2.51 
(5.53) 
Tenure with 
organization 
For about how long have you worked for your present 
employer? Coded as years. 
7.73 
(9.09) 
Substantive 
complexity 
Computed from the following    
learnjob: How long does it take to learn the key aspects of your 
job? (1=a few hours, 2=a day, 3=a few days to a week, 
4=several weeks, 5=2 to 5 months, 6=6 months to a year, 7=a 
few years, 8=5 years or more) 
4.95 
(1.98) 
 hiskill: My job requires a high level of skill. (Standard agreement 
responses) 
learning: I am constantly learning now things on my job. 
(Standard agreement responses)  
3.20 
(0.85) 
3.18 
(0.94) 
 Computed as mean score (learnjob/2, hiskill, and learning). 
Reliability α=.66 
2.95 
(0.72) 
Occupational 
skill  
Respondents were asked their job title what they did on their job. 
These responses were coded using the 1990 Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles published by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employment and Training Administration. These titles are 
-.02 
(0.86) 
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assigned ratings of various work functions based on studies 
conducted or funded by various branches of the government.   
This measure captures occupational skill as the mean of Z-scores 
for 8 occupational measures from DOT and other sources.  
SEIM Socioeconomic Index based upon males only  
Data score Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions 
with regards to data.  
 
People score Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions 
with regards to people.  
 
GED 
reasoning 
score 
General Education Development Scale for Reasoning 
Development required for the occupation. 
 
GED math 
score 
General Education Development Scale for Mathematical 
Development required by the occupation. 
 
SVP Specific Vocational Preparation measure represents the amount 
of time required by a typical worker to learn what is necessary to 
adequately perform the job.  The training may be acquired in 
school, work, military, institutional, or vocational settings. 
 
Average 
education 
average number of years of education of workers in the 1990 
Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted 
from the Current Population Survey, 1995. 
 
Percent 
college 
graduates 
percentage of workers having college degrees in the 1990 
Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted 
from the Current Population Survey, 1995. 
 
   Union           
membership 
Do you currently belong to a union? (Union=1) 0.18 
(0.39) 
Formal Organizational Position  
Based on Erik Wright’s (1978) model of social class including “contradictory 
locations” based in ownership, supervision, and skills. 
 
Employer size  See above 5.09 
(1.94) 
Organization 
type 
In your present job do you work for the government, a private 
company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you self-
employed?  
 
self-employed 2.3% 
Is a supervisor In your job, do you supervise the work of other employees? 
(Supervisor =1) 
49.5% 
Number How many people do you supervise directly or indirectly?   
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supervised 5 or fewer employees 24.9% 
6-20 employees 16.7% 
More than 20 employees 8.0% 
Skilled 
occupation 
Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which 
were then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution 
by occupational groups, see Table 4b. Occupational averages 
were obtained for eight skill related measures (SEI, DOT data 
and people scores, average GED reasoning and math scores, 
specific vocational preparation, average education for 
occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree). 
These were computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale, 
which was recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale > 
0) and low (scale<0) skilled worker.  
36.1% 
Formal 
organization 
position  
 
 
1. Non-Autonomous Worker – not self-employed, non-
supervisory, does not work in a “skilled” occupation 
37.2% 
2. First-Line Supervisor – not self-employed and supervises 5 
or less workers 
14.2% 
3. Semi-Autonomous Worker – not self-employed, non-
supervisory or supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a 
“skilled” occupation 
23.0% 
4. Lower Manager – not self-employed and supervises between 
6 and 20 people 
15.7% 
5. Upper/Middle Manager – not self-employed and supervises 
more than 20 people 
7.6% 
6. Large Employer/Capitalist – self-employed and employs 10 
or more workers 
2.3% 
Subjective Experience  
Job is 
meaningful 
Agreement with statement (standard responses):  
meaningl: I sometimes feel that the work I do is meaningless. 
(Not reflected for higher values to indicate greater meaning) 
3.98 
(1.43) 
Satisfaction 
with job 
security 
Uses standard satisfaction responses (1=not at all satisfied, 2=not 
too satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 4=very satisfied, and 
5=completely satisfied): 
satsecur: How satisfied are you with your level of job security? 
3.29 
(.85) 
Satisfaction 
with technology 
Uses standard satisfaction responses: 
sattech: How satisfied are you with the technology you use on 
your job?  
3.22 
(.78) 
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Supervisor 
relations 
Agreement with statements (standard responses):   
suprhelp: My supervisor is helpful to me in getting my job done. 4.00 
(1.28) 
suprcomp: My supervisor is competent in doing his or her job. 4.23 
(1.17) 
satsuper: How satisfied are you with your supervisors? (Uses 
standard satisfaction responses) 
4.14 
(1.13) 
 Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82 3.26 
(0.76) 
Coworker 
relations 
Agreement with statements (standard responses):   
cowohelp: My coworker is helpful to me in getting my job done. 4.21 
(1.03) 
cowocomp: My coworker is competent in doing his or her job. 4.26 
(0.93) 
satcowor: How satisfied are you with your coworkers? (Uses 
standard satisfaction responses) 
4.27 
(0.95) 
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82 3.35 
(0.56) 
Promotion 
equity 
Agreement with statements (standard responses):   
getahead: My employer wants to give everyone a chance to get 
ahead.  
3.61 
(1.39) 
 promfair: Promotions are handled fairly at my workplace.  3.42 
(1.44) 
 Reliability α=.78  2.84 
(0.90) 
Pay equity Uses standard satisfaction responses:  
 fairpay: On the whole, how satisfied are you that you are fairly 
paid for the skills that you have to offer your employer?  
3.67 
(1.31) 
 payyempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to 
others at your workplace? 
4.00 
(1.19) 
 payoempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to 
people who do work similar to yours for other employers? 
3.61 
(1.41) 
 Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.83 3.00 
(0/81) 
Discrimination 
at work 
Uses the responses 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=often:   
discsex: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at 
your job because of your sex? 
1.61 
(1.13) 
discrace: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against 
at your job because of your race or national origin? 
1.34 
(0.93) 
discage: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at 1.50 
(1.08) 
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your job because of your age? 
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.51 1.37 
(0.55) 
Job stress On a day-to-day basis, how stressful is your job? (1=never 
stressful, 2=seldom stressful, 3=sometimes stressful, 4=often 
stressful, 5=always stressful)  
3.48 
(0/89) 
Self- 
estrangement 
Agreement with statement (standard responses):  
judgment: Some of the things I have to do on my job go against 
my better judgment. 
1.97 
(1.03) 
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Figure 1. Generalized Workplace Model 
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Figure 2. Measurement Model for Consent 
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Figure 3. Measurement Model for Subjective Response: The Subjective World of 
the Worker 
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Table 1 Panel A. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on 
Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics. 
   Satisfaction Satisfaction Relations 
 Job is with Job with with 
 Meaningful Security Technology Coworkers 
Full Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
individual characteristics         
Gender (female=1) .10 * .03  .03  .13 ** 
Race (white=1) -.05  .05  .06  .00  
Age (by category) .14 ** -.13 ** .07  -.03  
Education (by achievement) .09  .01  -.02  .04  
Marital status (married=1) .00  -.05  .02  .02  
Organizational characteristics         
Employer size (by category) .07  -.06  .01  .04  
Organization Scope -.12 * -.06  .02  -.02  
Not-for-profit (=1) -.03  -.02  -.01  -.06  
Government (=1) -.09  .08  .01  -.02  
Industry concentration  -.02  -.08  -.03  -.01  
Job characteristics         
Technological change .05  -.02  .27 ** .03  
Part-time work -.09 * -.05  -.03  .05  
Hours at other jobs .02  -.07  .02  .01  
Hours worked at home .02  -.01  -.02  -.13 ** 
Tenure with organization -.14 ** .05  -.17 ** -.06  
Substantive complexity .21 ** .02  .15 ** .08  
Occupational skill (a) .00  -.12  -.11  .08  
Union Membership .09 * -.02  .00  .14 ** 
Structural position: Wright's class         
Class: Large Employer (=1) -.10 * -.04  -.05  .00  
Class: Large Manager (=1) -.02  .04  -.08  -.10 * 
Class: Small Manager (=1) -.09  .03  .00  -.09  
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1) -.08  .06  -.03  -.07  
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1) -.07  .09  .03  -.03  
Class Sheaf Coefficient .10  .10  .10  .12  
Informal position          
Consent .29 ** .41 ** .29 ** .31 ** 
         
         
R-squared .22  .20  .21  .15  
N 537   536   532   534   
Notes: coefficients are standardized        
* p<.05        ** p<.01   two tailed test        
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)   
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.    
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Table 1 Panel B. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on 
Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics. 
 Relations   Perceived 
 with Promotion Pay Discrim- 
 Supervisors Equity Equity ination 
Full Models Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
individual characteristics         
Gender (female=1) .10 * .03  -.02  .08  
Race (white=1) -.02  -.01  .10 * -.13 ** 
Age (by category) -.03  -.11 * -.04  -.01  
Education (by achievement) .00  .04  .05  -.06  
Marital status (married=1) .01  -.02  -.02  -.10 * 
Organizational characteristics         
Employer size (by category) -.01  .01  .09  .00  
Organization Scope -.02  -.03  .02  .05  
Not-for-profit (=1) .01  .03  -.09 * -.03  
Government (=1) .06  -.01  -.12 * .02  
Industry concentration  -.01  -.05  -.05  .10 * 
Job characteristics         
Technological change .00  -.04  .00  .03  
Part-time work -.06  -.03  -.03  .05  
Hours at other jobs -.07  .04  .03  .09 * 
Hours worked at home -.08 * -.05  -.05  .03  
Tenure with organization -.15 ** -.04  .11 * .04  
Substantive complexity .13 * .07  .01  .03  
Occupational skill (a) -.06  -.04  -.08  .00  
Union Membership .04  -.02  .10 * .07  
Structural position: Wright's class         
Class: Large Employer (=1) .00  -.07  .06  .03  
Class: Large Manager (=1) -.05  .02  .07  .03  
Class: Small Manager (=1) -.06  -.05  .02  .11 * 
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1) -.17 ** -.15 ** -.02  .18 ** 
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1) -.10  -.01  .06  .04  
Class Sheaf Coefficient .16 * .16  .11  .17 * 
Informal position          
Consent .48 ** .59 ** .35 ** -.28 ** 
         
         
R-squared .28  .38  .20  .17  
N 505  536  536  536  
Notes: coefficients are standardized        
* p<.05        ** p<.01   two tailed test        
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)   
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.    
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Table 1 Panel C. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, 
and Rewards on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal 
Position Characteristics. 
   Self 
 Job Estrange- 
 Stress ment 
Full Models Model 9 Model 10 
individual characteristics     
Gender (female=1) .07  -.14 ** 
Race (white=1) .01  .04  
Age (by category) .04  .04  
Education (by achievement) -.09  -.13 ** 
Marital status (married=1) -.01  -.04  
Organizational characteristics     
Employer size (by category) .03  -.04  
Organization Scope -.02  .07  
Not-for-profit (=1) .07  -.02  
Government (=1) -.01  .01  
Industry concentration  .01  -.04  
Job characteristics     
Technological change .06  -.03  
Part-time work .00  -.01  
Hours at other jobs .07  .03  
Hours worked at home .11 * .07  
Tenure with organization -.04  -.05  
Substantive complexity .24 ** .12 * 
Occupational skill (a) .10  -.01  
Union Membership .01  .00  
Structural position: Wright's class     
Class: Large Employer (=1) .00  -.03  
Class: Large Manager (=1) .13 * -.01  
Class: Small Manager (=1) .13 ** .10 * 
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1) .11 * .05  
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1) -.04  .01  
Class Sheaf Coefficient .19 ** .10  
Informal position      
Consent -.19 ** -.46 ** 
     
     
R-squared .16  .23  
N 537  535  
Notes: coefficients are standardized    
* p<.05        ** p<.01   two tailed test    
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor) 
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers. 
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Table 2. OLS Regressions of Subjective Response on Individual, 
Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics. 
 Subjective 
 Response 
Full Models Model 1 Model 2 
Individual characteristics   
Gender (female=1) -.01  .03  
Race (white=1) .00  .00  
Age (by category) -.07  -.07  
Education (by achievement) .10  .10 * 
Marital status (married=1) .01  .02  
Organizational characteristics     
Employer size (by category) .04  .03  
Organization Scope -.05  -.05  
Not-for-profit (=1) .05  .00  
Government (=1) -.08  -.05  
Industry concentration  -.11 * -.06  
Job characteristics     
Technological change .01  -.02  
Part-time work -.07  -.06  
Hours at other jobs -.06  -.04  
Hours worked at home -.07  -.08  
Tenure with organization -.06  -.05  
Substantive complexity .24 ** .09 * 
Occupational skill (a) .01  -.08  
Union Membership -.04  .04  
Structural position: Wright's class     
Class: Large Employer (=1) .00  -.03  
Class: Large Manager (=1) .06  -.02  
Class: Small Manager (=1) .00  -.09 * 
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1) -.10  -.17 ** 
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1) -.09  -.03  
Class Sheaf Coefficient .14  .16 ** 
Informal position      
Consent   .64 ** 
     
     
R-squared .14  .45  
N 463  463  
Notes: coefficients are standardized    
* p<.05        ** p<.01   two tailed test    
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor) 
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers. 
 
 
